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Economic Community of West African States: From an Economic 
Union to a Peacekeeping Mission? 




African countries were not part of that great industrial revolution of the eighteenth century that 
spawned the process of modernization and industrialization in western Europe and North 
America. [1] Indeed, they were colonies of some of the European powers. As a result, they were 
sometimes referred to as regimes of delayed industrialization [2] because they only started 
industrializing following independence. Hitherto, they served fundamentally as the sources for 
raw materials.  
Even after they gained their sovereignty on paper, it was discovered that they still relied heavily 
on the colonial powers for trade and economic survival. If African countries were to exculpate 
themselves from what was later termed neocolonialism, by some scholars, it was incumbent 
upon them to do business with each other. This philosophy was generally attractive and 
welcomed by some of the political actors who believe that economic sovereignty was a sine qua 
non for political sovereignty. How might these newly independent nations pursue their objective 
of continental economic autarky? The initial strategy was the creation of regional economic 
unions.  
So, in East Africa, there was the East African Economic Community. In French-speaking 
African states, there were a host of economic unions of which L' Organization Commune 
Africaine et Malagache (OCAM), L'Union Douaniere et Economic de L'Afrique Centrale 
(UDEAC), and L'Union des Etats d'Afrique Centrale (LTEAC) were some examples. And, in 
West Africa was created the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This 
essay examines the raison d'etre of the ECOWAS, and its contemporary peacekeeping role, 
against the backdrop of economic crisis in the area. Additionally, it seeks to briefly examine the 
role of Nigeria, the area's hegemonic power in the peace building enterprise within the context of 
the republic's foreign policy and national interest.  
 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)  
The widespread trend toward some form of regional economic grouping in both developed and 
developing countries is no doubt due to growing awareness of the importance of economic 
interdependence for the promotion of the economic well-being of the peoples of these countries, 
and for solving and facilitating the solution of some of the knotty economic problems which face 
individual countries. Even developed countries, which in the 1950s shunned regional integration, 
have since altered their views and style. For example, the European Coal and Steel community 
was formed in 1952, and the European Common market in 1957. [3] These were some of the 
precursors to the modem European Economic Community and European Union.  
The United Nations has also encouraged regional integration. Indeed, the Resolution on the 
"International Development strategy for the second UN development decade, urged developing 
countries to continue their attempts to put into effect plans for sub-regional and regional 
development." [4] It has also been recognized that self-reliance and growing cooperation among 
developing nations will further strengthen their role in the new international economic order.  
The beginning of the idea of regional economic grouping in West Africa can be traced back to 
initiatives emanating from the Economic Commission for Africa. [5] Representatives of the 
various African countries have held several meetings called by that Commission. For example, 
there was the Lagos Conference on Industrial Coordination in West Africa in November, 1963; 
the Niamey Conference on Economic Cooperation in October, 1963; and the Accra Conference 
of April, 1967, where the article of Association for the establishment of an Economic 
Community for West Africa was signed. [6]  
In 1968, heads of state of the West African group met in Monrovia, Liberia and signed the 
Protocol establishing the West African Regional group. The only achievement of the group was 
the preparation by Nigeria and Guinea of priority studies of areas of cooperation. The agreed 
areas of cooperation were trade, transport, communication, education, cultural exchange and 
information, research, health, energy, and heavy industries. [7]  
A number of attempts made at regional cooperation ended up in fiasco, but these failures did not 
stop the West African leaders from seeking other means of cooperation. It was to this end that 
Togo and Nigeria worked assiduously for the creation of regional economic cooperation.  
THE BIRTH OF ECOWAS  
The treaty establishing the EGOWAS was signed on May 28, 1975, by fifteen countries. These 
countries were Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin), the Republic of Gambia, the Republic of 
Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Guinea, Guinea Bissau, the Republic of Ivory Coast, the 
Republic of Liberia, the Republic of Mali, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Republic of 
Niger, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Senegal, the Republic of Sierra Leone, 
the Republic of Togo, and the Republic of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). Cape Verde joined 
later, and that brought the total membership to sixteen.  
 
The aims of ECOWAS are stated in Article Two of the treaty of the Community:  
1. It shall be the aim of the Community to promote cooperation and development in all fields of 
economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, monetary and financial 
questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its 
peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its 
members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.  
2. The Community shall by stages ensure:  
a. the elimination of custom duties and other similar charges in respect of importation and 
exportation of goods among Member States;  
b. the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the Member States;  
c. the establishment of a common custom tariff and a common commercial policy towards third 
countries;  
d. the abolition as between the Member states of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
services and capital;  
e. the harmonization of agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects in the 
Member States notably in the field of marketing, research and agro-industrial enterprises;  
f. the implementation of schemes for the joint development of transport, communication, energy 
and other infrastructural facilities as well as the evolution of a common policy in these fields;  
g. the harmonization of the economic and industrial policies of the Member States and the 
elimination of disparities in the levels of development of Member States;  
h. the harmonization required for the proper functioning of the Community, of the monetary 
policies of the Member States;  
i. the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development; and  
j. Such other activities calculated to further the aims and objectives of the Community as the 
Member States may from time to time undertake in common. [8]  
There exist a number of factors that made it difficult and sometimes impossible for West African 
states to implement the aims contained in the treaty. Such difficulties and problems have 
included inadequate infrastructure; road, railway, telecommunications, and other vital links for 
free movement of goods and persons. There have also been vested desires for the preservation of 
the existing state of affairs and the persistence of semi-colonial ties, sometimes referred to as 
neocolonialism, and lack of grassroots involvement. [9] These are the same as the problems that 
have prevented the realization of African unity at the continental level.  
Other difficulties known to have prevented economic union in West Africa in the past include 
the small proportion of world trade taking place within the sub-region, the different commercial 
and financial policies pursued by the countries as a result of their past colonial experience; over 
dependence of many of the African countries on revenues from Import duties and in some, 
manipulation of such duties to encourage foreign capital inflow and to protect industries; the 
existence of different currencies and payment arrangements and competition among them to have 
visible signs of development even when these are uneconomic.  
It is significant to note that the lesson to be learned from these problems and difficulties 
confronting earlier attempts to bring the West African nations together is that integration is a 
long term task subject to the uncertainties that characterize many international attempts.  
The formation of ECOWAS does not mean an instant solution to the problems confronting the 
area. It, however, provides the mechanism for combating the problems. One notable issue is that 
West African countries are mainly primary producers, the agricultural sector employing over 60 
percent of the labor force. [10] The member states' products are oriented to the market of 
developed countries. And until the economies of ECOWAS states undergo structural 
transformation through which agriculture (as is practiced today) will lose its preponderance to 
industry, ECOWAS member countries may not significantly be each other's customers. 
Economic integration under such circumstances is not likely to bring about a sizeable expansion 
of intra-ECOWAS trade in the immediate future.  
Another issue confronting the ECOWAS states is that of common payment, a problem that even 
the European Union is facing today. West African currencies which are tied to different major 
international currencies are not all convertible into each other. Article 38 of the ECOWAS treaty 
provides for creation of a Committee of West African Central Banks which would determine a 
clearing system of payments for the region. [11] Currency unification would serve as an effective 
response to the problem of disparate exchange rates within an integrated scheme. It is hoped that 
under one currency the liberty for capital movement will be improved, and it would also take 
care of problems of balance of payments in intra-union trade.  
Moreover, a major problem that ECOWAS faces is that of determination of location of major 
industries. Indeed, every country wants industries, since they provide jobs and are believed to 
enhance modernization. [12]  
 
ECONOMIC AND THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR ECOWAS  
The theoretical rationale of economic integration in West Africa is generally based on possible 
ways in which economic integration affects the rate of growth of Gross National Product (GNP) 
of participating countries. Such economic integration should therefore result in some of the 
following: 1. Enlargement of the size of the market for firms otherwise producing below 
optimum capacity. A large market catering for about 130-200 million consumers is also 
considered significant to sustain heavy industries such as engineering and chemical plants. These 
would be vehicles for modernization. 2. Economic integration will increase the level of 
economic activity through increased trade, and at the same time allow the exploitation of 
external economies and inter-industry linkages and also lead to lowering of production cost. 3. 
The economic integration envisaged by ECOWAS would lead to economic cooperation, and 
promotion of economic efficiency through specialization. In short, economic integration would 
bring about mor e adequate use of resources and harmonization of economic and trade policies 
among member states.  
The significance of developing the infrastructure cannot be over-stressed and remains one of the 
important objectives of the ECOWAS. And indeed, without an efficient regional transport and 
communication network, economic integration and later political union would have little 
meaning.  
One of the most important anticipated outcomes of the present economic union of West African 
States is the eventual continental union which could emerge from such an integration. This 
dream is reinforced by Article 27 (1 and 2) of ECOWAS Treaty, which states that:  
Citizens of Member States shall be regarded as Community citizens and accordingly Member 
States undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the 
Community.  
Member States shall by agreement with each other exempt Community citizens from holding 
visitors visas and resident permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and 
industrial activities within their territories. [13]  
Social intercourse is extremely important in any kind of politico-economic relations. Such 
intercourse in the past has been mitigated by the problems of visas and, generally, free travel 
among the various countries. It could be argued that as more Africans travel and meet with other 
Africans outside their own states, this could kindle a spirit of understanding which is helpful for 
African unity.  
Thus, Article 27 (1 and 2) provides not only the groundwork for economic integration in West 
Africa, but also a model which is very significant for a future continental union. Optimism was 
even expressed that ECOWAS working together with other regional groupings could further the 
1991 African Economic Treaty aimed at establishing a common market in A..D. 2025. Indeed, it 
is also hoped that like in Europe, this treaty could lead to the inauguration of an elected African 
Parliament with a supranational characteristic. [14]  
In sum, it is one thing to formulate policies and quite another to implement them. The quest to 
address the problem of underdevelopment in the sub-region is without doubt very urgent. 
Unfortunately, it is over two decades now since ECOWAS was created, yet the area has not 
come close to satisfactorily resolving the fundamental issues contained in its treaty.  
To be sure, trade flows between member nations of ECOWAS appear to have increased since the 
organization's inception. But, contended Mamit Deme, "the volume of trade flows between 
ECOWAS member countries and industrial countries is proportionately much larger than the 
intraregional trade flows. For ECOWAS members as a whole, the average annual volume of 
imports from industrialized countries during the 1981-1992 period was US$13.22 billion. For the 
same period the average annual volume of imports from African countries was merely US$1.59 
billion, of which US$1.24 billion is from EGO WAS member countries." [15]  
Arguably, the above issue is not based on ECOWAS' lack of efforts; it is based on both internal 
and external conditionalities. Internally, the area has been faced with numerous civil wars, 
military coups, and counter coups. Externally, the international lending organizations have made 
the region completely depend00ent on the creditors, such that a majority of member states of the 
EGO WAS lack the major elements of sovereignty.[16 The economic misery suffered by the 
poor in these states is so poignant that a majority of the citizens have been forced to develop 
antagonistic attitudes toward the state; indeed, they may have in their vexation toward the state 
"deligitimized" it.  
The Human Development Index (HDI), of the 1997 Human Development Report, of the sixteen 
member states of the ECOWAS is not reassuring against the backdrop of the aims and objectives 
of the organization. Sierra Leone ranked (175), Niger (173), Burkina Faso (172), Mali (171), 
Guinea (167), Gambia (165), Guinea Bissau (163), Senegal (160), Mauritania (150), Togo (147), 
Benin (146), Cote d'Ivoire (145), Nigeria (141), Ghana (132), and Cape Verde (123); Liberia was 
omitted in the survey because of the civil war in that country. [17] But there were a total of 175 
nations measured for this report. The Human Development Index report combines life 
expectancy, literacy, and distribution of income or basic purchasing power as generally linked 
with a nation's overall economic prosperity. In short, the "statistics reflect people's well-being 
and the opportunities that they actually enjoy."'8 its poor economic record so far, why did the 
group embark upon a risky and unpredictable peacekeeping mission in Liberia? Furthermo re, 
could this mission signal a shift in its emphasis on economic development in the area to that of 
peacekeeping in a region that is fraught with ethnic and political problems?  
 
PEACEKEEPING MISSION: A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS  
Arguably, peacekeeping attempts predate the modem nation-state system. This is especially so 
when defined within the context of maintaining international peace and security. It was, 
however, during the birth of the modern state system that the quest for peace and stability took 
on an added dimension. This policy was pursued within the framework of a balance of power 
system. Historically, two major epochs, among others, might illustrate the move toward peace 
and security in Europe. The first period was from 1648 (the treaty of Westphalia) to 1789 (the 
French Revolution), commonly referred to as the first golden age of classical balance of power. 
The second period was from 1815 to 1914, generally touted the second golden age of classical 
balance of power.  
During the former, religious conflict was reduced, mercantilism was superseded by free trade, 
and absolute monarchies gradually started to lose their significance to popular sovereignty. 
Although wars between nation-states persisted, they were of low intensity. [19] The latter saw 
such powers as England, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia pursue a policy of stable 
and ideologically similar or uniform international politics. [20] This state of relative peace 
provided opportunities for free movement of people and trade.  
Following WWII and in the aftermath of the decolonization process in Africa and elsewhere, the 
proliferation of independent sovereign states with their distinct and often conflicting national 
interests created international tensions. Indeed, the character of the post-colonial state in Africa, 
and the balkanization of Eastern Europe into independent sovereign states following the collapse 
of communism in that area created severe ethnic strains (for example, the Republic of Georgia), 
and in some cases irredentist wars (for instance, Bosnia-Herzogovina and Yugoslavia).  
The formation of the League of Nations after WWI and its successor, the United Nations after 
WWII, were intended to ameliorate activities by nation-states that were likely to threaten 
international peace and security. It was in attempts to avoid the catastrophic consequences of 
both wars, that the international community, inter alia, encouraged the use of peacekeeping 
missions when measures such as the use of the good offices of the UN and regional endeavors 
failed to lead to the pacification of a conflict.  
The general strategy of a peacekeeping operation is the interposition of a multinational force 
between combatants to provide the enabling environment for peaceful resolution of a political 
dispute. In this regard, the views propounded by the International Peace Academy in the early 1 
980s is instructive and approximates the overall mechanism of the process, viz: "the prevention, 
containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the 
medium of third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational 
military, police, and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace." [21]  
The activities of the UN in the area of peacekeeping, peace making, and peace enforcement have 
been daunting. Indeed, it has had its successes and failures in Central America, the Middle East, 
Asia, and elsewhere. The intensification of the peacekeeping role of the UN appears to have 
gathered momentum following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, soft states that were pawns in 
the superpower rivalry and the politics of the zero-sum-game, were now free to exercise their 
right to national self-determination. The consequences were disastrous for such1 dependencies as 
Mozambique, Zaire, Angola, Ethiopia, and others. In fact, of the thirty-eight peacekeeping 
missions sponsored by the United Nations since its inception in 1945, twenty-five were put into 
force between 1988 and 1995. [22]  
Moreover, with the emergence of the "new international world order," the political calculus 
within the UN as to its strategy for handling conflicts had to be adjusted in accordance with 
contemporary realism--i.e, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. This demise, in the 
thinking of many observers, not only signaled the victory of democracy over communism, but 
also illustrated its superiority. With the Russian Federation, the major remnant following the 
implosion of the former USSR, now a full fledged member of the democratic club in the UN, and 
with the wind of change and euphoria of political liberalization blowing across Africa and 
elsewhere, the UN was "compelled" to assume two non-traditional roles. The first was the 
enforcement of peace, such as in Yugoslavia and Somalia, and the second was to take on the role 
of an instrument for democratic transition. [23] The latter was designed to build and promote the 
conditionalities for the sustenance of democracy and peace. This philosophy was propagate d in 
1992 by the erstwhile Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who termed this genre of UN 
peacekeeping strategy in his Agenda for Peace, Postconflict Peace Building.24  
In Africa, UN peacekeeping missions have taken on different forms because of the complexities 
of the political issues in the area. For instance, in Angola and Mozambique, it took on the 
onerous task of implementing political as well as democratic transitions. In Namibia, it 
conducted elections to establish an independent state of Namibia, and is presently preparing 
Western Sahara for a national referendum intended to lead to the area's independence from 
Morocco.  
In sum, with all its good intentions, the UN is generally plagued with a number of contradictions-
-rooted in its axioms of sovereignty, neutrality, and attaining democratic peace. To compound 
the organization's problems is the fact that UN agents are often confronted with both 
international and indigenous obstacles, as for example, Somalia, that sometimes render their 
missions impossible. The situation in Liberia falls within this framework, and hence the 
allurement for a regional solution to a common problem in the continent.  
 
THE LIBERIAN CRISIS  
The frequency of civil wars in the continent is commonplace due to economic and ethnopolitical 
crisis. The sometimes overt and covert involvement of African states in the internal affairs of 
countries experiencing such wars, in contravention of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN charter, 
which forbids member nations of the UN from doing so, is not novel. In West Africa, though, the 
collective action of member states of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in the Liberian political crisis was unique. This was so because provisions were not 
made in the ECOWAS treaty for a military action to bring about peace to a member state. To be 
sure, African countries have been involved in peacekeeping efforts, but these were carried out 
under the auspices of the United Nations which has the infrastructure for such an undertaking. 
Witness for example, the UN peacekeeping operation in the Suez Canal in 1956 to resolve the 
British, Israeli, and Egyptian crisis, and the Congo issue of 1960. [25] Moreover, suc h actions 
were generally implemented on an ad hoc basis to tackle conflicts that were construed to be a 
threat to international peace and security.  
It is true that such regional organizations as the Organization of American States (OAS) has been 
successful at regional peace operations in the Americas. The OAS operated in the Dominican 
republic in 1965 and more recently in Haiti to restore democracy. In these operations, the United 
States remained the hegemonic power and generally acted on the basis of her national interest, 
and within the context of the Monroe doctrine, which places the area within the sphere of its 
influence. In Africa, however, no regional organization has ever taken a peacekeeping mission 
before ECOWAS interloped in Liberia. [26]  
The major regional power in the region and ECOWAS itself is Nigeria, which like any other 
regional hegemon, tends to equate its national interest with that of the group. Nigeria became the 
major dramatis personae in the Liberian political saga, when it created ECOWAS Cease-fire 
Monitoring Group, whose acronym was ECOMOG. Despite initial opposition within its ranks 
spearheaded by Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, ECOMOG pursued with resiliency its twin 
objectives of making and enforcing peace. [27] The following discussion centers on Nigeria, 
whose participation was paramount for the successful conclusion of the mission.  
 
NIGERIA AND ECOMOG  
There are two possible contending theories, or schools of thought, regarding Nigeria's 
involvement and leadership in the operation. Scholars of the first school argue that the internal 
political dynamics in the country accounted for Nigeria's active participation in the peace 
mission, especially since such matters are generally within the purview of the United Nations. 
The second school stresses the importance of Nigeria in the region and the centrality of its 
foreign policy in West Africa in particular, and Africa in general.  
According to the first school, President Babangida's transition program to a democratic rule in 
Nigeria from 1989-1993 appeared to be going nowhere. Primary elections were canceled and 
rescheduled. Babangida and his administration's ability to dribble the political entrepreneurs and 
society "maradonically," by the late 80s and early 90s had created profound anxiety and 
frustration, particularly, among members of the informed public and the media. Indeed, the 
general opinion in the country regarding the transition program was that it was a farce, if not a 
ruse. They contended that despite the administration's timetable for handing over power to a 
democratically elected politicians, Babangida had his own "hidden" agenda. The print medium 
and others who belonged to this school were relentless in their criticism of the administration on 
this score. They insisted that Nigeria's profound involvement in ECOMOG was intended to 
divert the people's attention from the political blunders at home. They argued, that the a 
ssumption on the part of the regime was, that Nigerians would rally behind their government at a 
time of crisis involving a preponderant number of Nigerian soldiers. Within this school, 
moreover, were those who contended that, Babangida, having survived a military coup, wanted 
to keep the soldiers busy by sending the possible "trouble" makers in the military away from 
Lagos and Abuja. In this way, they would be less likely to foment another coup in light of the 
internal political dislocation and unsteadiness.  
The second school of thought which I shall term the national interest school, attempts to explain 
Nigeria's activities in the ECOWAS and ECOMOG within the context of Nigerian foreign 
policy. It is on the assumptions of this school that I will focus my succeeding analysis.  
 
ECOMOG AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST SCHOOL  
The ethnically induced civil war in Liberia between the Americo-Liberian and the indigenous 
population which was triggered following sergeant Samuel Doe's coup d'etat of April 1980 had 
reached its crescendo by the late 1980s. The activities of Charles Taylor and his National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the other forces were causing casualties both in human life 
and property. The refugee problem was taxing the resources of the neighboring countries. [28] 
Furthermore, in the carnage, foreign nationals became a pawn in the civil war. For whatever 
tactical reasons, Nigerian citizens living in Liberia became the major bete noire and target for 
NPLF's retribution. [29] Arguably, Nigeria's prestige as the hegemon in the area and harassment 
of its citizens living in Liberia, the political instability in Sierra Leone, the refugee problems in 
the neighboring countries, and the possible domino-effect of the civil war in the region served as 
the rationales for Nigeria's military putsch in Liberia--a mission wh ich General Sani Abacha 
claimed cost the Nigerian government over US$3 billion. [30]  
Theoretically, a hegemon assumes a leadership stance in a community of nations for the purpose 
of expanding its power, influence, authority, and control in order to obtain greater economic and 
security advantage. [31] Within this context, it seeks a policy of expansionism through 
economic, political, and military control. A hegemonic power tends to succeed in its endeavor 
because of its overbearing and sometimes intimidating presence. Such an imposing stature is 
furthered by its ability to provide goods and services that are needed by the "lesser" and weaker 
states. Indeed, Pax Britannica and Pax Americana have been cited as examples of hegemonic 
states enforcing peace and security on the international scene and system as a strategy to promote 
the interest of the hegemonic state. [32] Today, in the political conversation in West Africa and 
Nigeria in particular, there is already talk of Pax Nigeriana [33] in the wake of Nigeria's 
successful performance in the Liberian crisis. In fact, with a population of 80 --100 million, a 
GDP of $30 billion and a strong military to match, Nigeria is on course to pursue its interest in 
the region.  
In order to pursue its foreign policy objectives within the African and regional context, [34] 
Nigeria invoked the tenets of Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the charter of the United Nations on 
Regional Arrangements. In this way, ECOMOG was able to receive support from the 
international community, because its actions could not be misconstrued as usurping the powers 
of the Security Council under Article 34 and 35. [35]  
 
Indeed, Article 52 states:  
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies 
for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as 
are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their 
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.  
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such 
agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such 
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security 
Council.  
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes 
through such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference 
from the Security Council [ldots] [36]  
Having cleared the above hurdle, as it were, Nigeria was now prepared to pursue its foreign 
policy interest within the framework of ECOMOG. To this end, President Babangida declared:  
We are in Liberia because events in that country have led to massive destruction of property, the 
massacre by all parties of thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women, 
and children, some of whom have sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic 
missions, hospitals, and under Red Cross protection contrary to all recognized standards of 
civilized behavior and international ethics and decorum. [37]  
Although the above assertion represented the official view of the administration, there may be 
two other remote causes for Nigeria's reaction to the Liberian upheaval. First, the war was 
affecting Nigeria's economic interest (both governmental and non-governmental). Second, the 
Samuel Doe regime was friendly to the Babangida Administration, and Babangida, for his own 
personal interest, did not want to see a friendly government replaced by a hostile one--e., Charles 
Taylor. After all, Nigeria established the Ibrahim Babangida School of Political Science and 
Strategic Studies in Monrovia for a cost of US$20 million in appreciation of the cordial relations 
between both governments. [38] Furthermore, Nigeria was concerned that if Taylor was allowed 
to succeed, he might foment trouble in Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, countries that were 
considered friendly to Nigeria.  
Economically, and because of its share size and wealth in the region, Nigeria's export to member 
nations of ECOWAS is substantial. However, it is difficult to observe the effect of economic 
growth in intra-ECOWAS trade in the overall well-being of the citizens of member states. In 
fact, Mamit Deme in his study discovered that "imports from industrialized countries by Nigeria, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana and Senegal on the average grew (or decreased) by -3%, -1%, 24%, 
6% and -2%, while those from ECOWAS partner countries grew by 8%, 14%, 22%, 3%, and 
5%." [39] These figures are represented in Table 1.  
The figures presented below represent business flows at the official level. The volume of trade 
between private citizens at the informal level that are unaccounted for, is phenomenal. This 
involves the underground economic intercourse which is rampant in the region. [40] Also, the 
table shows that the ECOWAS still spend more for goods and services from Western Europe.  
Nigeria created the ECOWAS because it was in her interest, realist scholars would argue. 
Economically, too, political instability in the area could not further its interest of economic 
integration and mutual cooperation. [41] In fact, the desire for regional stability has always been 
a major objective of the various Nigerian regimes from Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa to General Sani Abacha. For example, General Yakubu Gowon who was a signatory to 
the ECOWAS treaty in 1975 observed that such a grouping was likely to mitigate the role of 
France among Francophone West African states. Economic health in the area could promote 
political security and the protection of Nigerian borders. [42] General Olusegun Obasanjo also 
noted that Nigerian foreign policy objective included the establishment of the desired political 
and economic conditions in the area to promote Nigeria's economic development. [43] President 
Babangida summed up Nigeria's interest thus: "When certain events occur in this sub-
region...which are bound to affect Nigeria's politico-military and socio-economic environment 
we should not stand by as helpless and hapless spectators." [44]  
Moreover, the fact that the internal economic dynamics of a nation-state tends to influence 
foreign policy decisions is illustrated in the concern and pressures from multinational 
corporations who stand to lose a lot of money in unhealthy political climates. For example, 
Cadbury Nigeria Limited, one of several major corporations doing business within the ECOWAS 
member states brought pressure to bear on the Nigerian government to create an enabling 
environment in Liberia for it to do business. Indeed, Margaret Vogt wrote: "The Managing 
Director of Cadbury Nigeria Limited [a confection company] stated that his company had lost 
over N$10million in export proceeds since the beginning of the Liberian crisis. If this was true 
for Cadbury, it was bound to be true for other Nigerian companies doing business with Liberia..." 
[45]  
Another area of concern to Nigeria in her foreign policy and ultimate participation in the 
peacekeeping effort in Liberia relates to its claim that West Africa is within her sphere of 
influence--a sort of "Nigerian Monroe doctrine." The interference of Libya, United States, 
France, and other external powers in Liberia was considered to be inimical to the overall interest 
of Nigeria. The United States and France aside, Libya, Nigeria's political nemesis in Chad, was 
known to be supplying arms and ammunition to Charles Taylor's NPLF. Such successful 
"external" encroachment was bound to create the impression that Nigeria was not only weak, but 
also unable to resolve a political crisis in her "backyard." Nigeria's failure to act in Liberia might 
further the notion that Nigeria was only a "paper tiger" in the region. Faced with these 
circumstances, as it were, Nigeria was determined to do whatever it took to bring peace to 
Liberia even in the light of mounting criticisms at the home front and billions of nairas i t had 
spent on the operation.  
 
END OF THE WAR  
The general assumption, noted Eva Bertram, is that peace building attempts tend to share certain 
fundamental characteristics: 1. they deal with conflicts within rather than between states; 2. the 
host government is one of the parties to the conflict; 3. their aim is to develop and/ or implement 
a political transition following or accompanying an end to military hostilities; and 4. a central 
component is the reform or establishment of basic state institutions. [46] Retrospectively, the 
development in Liberia followed the above chronological order.  
Indeed, the painstaking efforts toward peace came to fruition as a result of a series of complex 
negotiations in which Nigeria as the leader of ECOMOG played a major role. The formation of 
an interim legislative body, and the multiparty elections that followed culminating in the victory 
of Charles Ghankay Taylor were some of the important, yet occasionally problematic, steps 
undertaken by ECOMOG. On August 2, 1997, at the swearing-in ceremony of Taylor as the 
twenty-first President of the Republic of Liberia, General Sani Abacha, current chairman of 
ECOWAS, said:  
Indeed, as we look back on the many attempts at finding peace for Liberia, the victory which we 
celebrate becomes even more precious and uplifting. The catalogue of all those conferences 
which resulted in so many peace accords from Banjul in 1990 to Yamousoukro--a series of talks, 
from Geneva to Cotonou and then Akosombo to Accra should remind us how difficult and 
fraught with frustration and even [how dangerous] this whole process had been. The Abuja 
agreement of 1995 and its Revised Schedule of implementation of August, 1996, were a 
culmination of all these efforts. [47]  
It goes without saying that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia under the auspices of 
ECOMOG is epochal in spite of the antinomies and intermittent political, diplomatic, and 
military setbacks. This is even more so because unlike the UN, ECOMOG lacked both the 
structural and institutional mechanisms for peacekeeping. Yet, when push came to shove, the 
group, despite members limitations and contradictory national interests, the complexities of the 
ethnic character of the civil war itself, succeeded in this important mission. It must be noted, 
though, that the outcome of the operation would have been more difficult were it not for the 
support of the United Nations. To this end, it could be argued that such a regional attempt at 
solving regional problems, with the assistance of the international community, might become a 
model in the "New International World Order."  
 
LOOKING AHEAD  
If there was any lesson to be learned from the Liberian crisis, it might be to remind ourselves of 
one of Sir Winston Churchill's dicta regarding wars when he said: "It is easy to start a war, but 
difficult to end one." This view was echoed by General Sani Abacha at the inauguration of 
Charles Taylor when he affirmed: "... if the difficulties we have encountered teach any lessons, it 
is that wars, especially civil wars, are easy to ignite on the raw emotions of ethnic chauvinism, 
but difficult to stop, even when our instincts of nationalism finally compel us to draw back from 
the brink." [48] In spite of these words of wisdom, ECOMOG is poised to undertake a somewhat 
similar mission in Sierra Leone following the military coup of Major Johnny P. Koroma on May 
25, 1997, that toppled the regime of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.  
Whatever might become of the Sierra Leonean operation, ECOWAS must not become oblivious 
to the fundamental objectives of economic growth and solvency in the region. It is true that civil 
wars tend to affect the flow of trade, but ethnically motivated crisis and political instability in the 
sub-region issue from the problems of underdevelopment and scarce resources. Indeed, it is the 
competition for the meager resources in the area that, inter alia, trigger ethnic and racial conflicts 
in Africa.  
ECOWAS was not created as a war machine; it was established as an economic union for the 
purpose of assailing the intractable condition of poverty existing in this region. [49] While 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG deservedly celebrates its triumph in Liberia and now attempts to plunge 
itself into the Sierra Leonean imbroglio, it must also be prepared to pursue its policy of economic 
revival with equal, if not more, vigor than the peace efforts in Liberia. In this way, ECOWAS 
would not be placing the cart before the horse. Normatively, too, as the area marches toward the 
next millennium, it should be noted that economic revitalization is a sine qua non for peace and 
stability. Indeed, it is only when member states of the ECOWAS pursue vigorously the tenets of 
its treaty within the context of liberalization and democracy that the area might be spared of the 
crisis that engulfed Liberia and now rages in Sierra Leone.  
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